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Abstract
The South China Sea is host to a complex coastal geography, numerous sovereignty disputes over islands
featuring multiple claimants, excessive and controversial claims to baselines, confl icting and overlapping
claims to maritime jurisdiction and, most recently, contested submissions regarding extended continental
shelf rights. The objective of this paper is to review and analyse these issues from spatial, legal and
geopolitical perspectives. An overview and assessment of the geographical and geopolitical factors that
inform and underlie the South China Sea disputes is offered prior to the claims of the littoral states to
baselines and maritime zones being assessed. Maritime boundary agreements and joint development
zones are also highlighted. Finally, indications that maritime jurisdictional claims are being more
vigorously enforced are explored.
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Introduction
The South China Sea is host to a complex coastal
geography, numerous sovereignty disputes over
islands featuring multiple claimants, excessive and
controversial claims to baselines, conflicting and
overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction and, most
recently, contested submissions regarding extended
continental shelf rights. The objective of this paper
is to review and analyse these issues from spatial,
legal and geopolitical perspectives. An overview and
assessment of the geographical and geopolitical
factors that inform and underlie the South China
Sea disputes is offered prior to the claims of the
littoral states to baselines and maritime zones being
assessed. Maritime boundary agreements and joint
development zones are also highlighted. Finally,
indications that maritime jurisdictional claims are
being more vigorously enforced are explored.

•

The Paracel Islands, which comprise around
130 islands, predominantly divided between
the Crescent and Amphritite groups (disputed
between China/Taiwan and Vietnam);

•

The Pratas Islands, the principle feature of
which is Pratas Reef, which is a circular coral
reef 11 miles across, enclosing a substantial
lagoon (under the administration of Taiwan,
claimed by China);

•

Scarborough Reef (or Shoal), a feature
consisting of a large coral atoll, submerged at
high tide save for several small outcrops, and
associated lagoon (disputed between China/
Taiwan and the Philippines), and Macclesfield
Bank, located to the west of Scarborough Reef,
which is an entirely and permanently submerged
feature;

•

The Spratly Islands, consisting of around
150–180 generally small islands, islets, rocks,
reefs as well as numerous low-tide elevations
and submerged features (claimed in whole or
in part by Brunei, China/Taiwan, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Vietnam); and,

•

The Natuna Islands which comprise an
extensive group of over 200 islands and other
insular features in the southwestern South
China Sea.

Geographical and geopolitical
context
The South China Sea is a large semi-enclosed
sea, encompassing at least three million square
kilometres, bordered by – in clockwise order from
the north – China and Taiwan; the Philippines;
Malaysia; Brunei Darussalam (Brunei); Indonesia;
Singapore; and Vietnam. Additionally, Cambodia
and Thailand border the South China Sea’s Gulf of
Thailand extension. A key consequence of the South
China Sea’s semi-enclosed character, coupled with
the large number of coastal states involved, is that
their maritime claims tend to converge and overlap
with one another. The broad dimensions of the
South China Sea mean that there is in excess of 400
nautical miles (nm) between opposing shores; a large
high-seas pocket or ‘doughnut hole’ may exist in the
central South China Sea (see below). The maritime
jurisdictional scenario is, however, considerably
complicated by the presence of multiple groups of
insular features of diverse types in the South China
Sea. The principle island groups of the South China
Sea are as follows (clockwise from the northwest):

As indicated above, with the exception of the
Natuna Islands, which are under the uncontested
sovereignty of Indonesia, sovereignty over all
of these island groups is subject to dispute.
Additionally, with respect to issues of maritime
jurisdiction, the South China Sea islands are
potentially highly significant. In this context the
legal status of these insular features, as well as
their potential role in the delimitation of maritime
boundaries, assumes critical significance. For
example, should the disputed South China
Sea islands be classified as islands capable of
generating exclusive economic zones (EEZs) to 200
nautical miles (as opposed to “rocks” which cannot),
then the potential high seas pocket mentioned
above disappears.
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Geopolitical drivers for the South
China Sea disputes
The key geopolitical factors that inform, underlie
and drive the South China Sea disputes include
abiding concerns over sovereignty and sovereign
rights, concerns over freedom of navigation and
the security of critical sea lanes, and marine
resource access considerations. Among these
factors sovereignty looms large. Despite deepening
globalisation, bounded Westphalian territorial
states have by no means withered away, perhaps
least of all in East and Southeast Asia. Disputed
sovereignty, especially over land territory (disputed
islands), therefore remains a root cause for the
South China Sea islands disputes, especially when
coupled with the negative influences of historical
competition and animosity.
The South China Sea is host to a series of Sea
Lines of Communication (SLOCs) of regional and
global significance. Secure SLOCs and freedom of
navigation are essential to the smooth functioning of
the global economy as international trade remains
overwhelmingly reliant on maritime transport.
Indeed, if anything, this dependence on sea-borne
trade is accentuated for the generally resourcepoor but export-oriented economies of East and
Southeast Asia, and in this context the SLOCs that
traverse the South China Sea are unquestionably
crucial. There is also a strong, and increasing,
energy security dimension to sea lane security in
the region. It is worth noting that the network of
SLOCs connecting the constricting chokepoints that
provide entry to and egress from the South China
Sea tend to avoid the disputed South China Sea
islands as hazards to navigation.
Concerning access to marine resources, there
has been a long-standing – though arguably not
well-founded – perception that the disputed areas
of the South China Sea host substantial reserves
of seabed energy resources. Such hydrocarbons,
should they exist, would undoubtedly be highly
attractive to the South China Sea littoral states,
all of whom save for Brunei are facing increasingly
urgent energy security concerns. However,
estimates regarding the oil and gas potential
of the South China Sea vary wildly; they are
often speculative, poorly supported, and are
thus frequently highly misleading and should be
viewed with caution. Nonetheless, the persistent
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perception that the South China Sea represents a
major potential source of seabed energy resources
remains a key driver in the South China Sea
disputes. Recent incidents involving oil and gas
exploration activities in the South China Sea have
served to reinforce this view.
Finally, the semi-enclosed, tropical environment of
the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand hosts
marine environments of great richness in biodiversity
terms. These environments support fisheries of
significance in global, and certainly regional, terms,
especially with respect to the food security of coastal
populations numbered in the hundreds of millions.
It follows that access to the waters of the South
China Sea for fishing, as well as the preservation and
protection of the marine environment that supports
such activities, should be the top priority for the
South China Sea coastal states. Unfortunately,
however, the marine environment, biological
diversity and living resources in question are widely
acknowledged to be under serious threat.

Claims to maritime jurisdiction
All of the South China Sea littoral states, with the
sole exception of Cambodia, are parties to the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Consequently, it is appropriate to assess their
claims to maritime jurisdiction against the backdrop
of UNCLOS.

Baselines
Maritime claims are dependent on sovereignty over
land territory possessing a coast in keeping with
the legal maxim that ‘the land dominates the sea’.
Baselines along coasts are, in turn, fundamental to
claims to maritime jurisdiction, as maritime zones
are measured from such baselines. UNCLOS1
provides for multiple types of baselines. However, in
the absence of any other claims, ‘normal’ baselines
coincident with the low-water line as shown on
large-scale charts recognised by the coastal state
concerned will prevail in accordance with Article
5 of UNCLOS. In the context of the South China
1 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Publication no.E97.V10, (New York, NY: United Nations, 1983).
See, 1833 UNTS 3, opened for signature 10 December 1982,
Montego Bay, Jamaica (entered into force 16 November 1994),
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_
overview_convention.htm>.
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Sea, normal baselines as well as the convention’s
provisions on the baselines of reefs (Article 6 of
UNCLOS) are particularly relevant to the baselines and
maritime claims of the generally disputed South China
Sea islands. Normal baselines are also applicable to
the maritime claims of Brunei as well as of those of
China and Vietnam within the Gulf of Tonkin.
With regard to the mainland coasts of the states
surrounding the South China Sea, the majority of
the states concerned evidently consider that their
coasts are deeply indented or fringed with islands
in their immediate vicinity and have accordingly
defined systems of straight baselines as provided for
under Article 7 of UNCLOS. Such claims to straight
baselines have been made by Cambodia, China and
Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. While Malaysia has
yet to officially publicise the location of its straight
baselines, it is evident from Malaysian maps that
such claims have been made. These claimed straight
baselines are predominantly extensive and often front
generally smooth coastlines or serve to link small,
widely separated islands remote from mainland
coastlines. Consequently, these claims have
attracted international protests, notably from the
United States, which undertakes a systematic review
of the maritime practice of other states as part of its
Freedom of Navigation (FON) program. Additionally,
two of the South China Sea littoral states, Indonesia
and the Philippines, are archipelagic states and have
defined archipelagic baselines in keeping with Article
47 of UNCLOS.

Claims to maritime jurisdiction
In keeping with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS,
the South China Sea coastal states have generally
claimed 12nm territorial seas and EEZs to 200nm
from baselines together with continental shelf rights.
Most of these claims have tended to be ambit in
character. That is, they simply specify the maximum
allowable breadth of the maritime zone in question, in
keeping with the terms of UNCLOS. However, some
more specific unilateral claims have been advanced,
notably within the Gulf of Thailand; in the South China
Sea proper by Malaysia in 1979; by Brunei in 1988;
and Indonesia in 2010. Perhaps unsurprisingly given
the disputes concerning sovereignty over islands,
these unilateral maritime claims overlap with one
another to a substantial extent.

arguments. Within the Gulf of Thailand, Thailand
has since 1959 claimed the northernmost extension
of that body of water, the Bight of Bangkok, as a
historic bay. Additionally, since 1982 Cambodia
and Vietnam have claimed an oblong area of
‘joint historic waters’ projecting from their coasts,
but within their claimed straight baselines, in the
Gulf of Thailand. The Philippines has also long
claimed rights within its Treaty Limits, that is, the
‘box’ formed by several late nineteenth and early
twentieth-century treaties. China’s controversial
so-called ‘nine-dashed line’ or ‘U-shaped line’ claim
may also constitute a historic claim to large portions
of the South China Sea. It remains uncertain whether
the dashed line represents a claim to sovereignty
over the disputed islands within that territory –
indicative of a unilateral claim to a maritime boundary
– or represents a claim to the maritime spaces within
the dashes, whether as historic waters or another
type of maritime zone.
Submissions relating to the outer limits of the
continental shelf where it extends beyond 200nm
from baselines made in 2009 by Vietnam alone
and Malaysia and Vietnam jointly to the United
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf (CLCS) have led to some clarification in the
maritime claims of at least some of the South China
Sea states. The implication of these submissions
is that, as far as Malaysia and Vietnam at least
are concerned, the disputed islands of the South
China Sea should not be awarded full 200nm EEZ
and continental shelf rights. These submissions
prompted China to issue protest notes which,
importantly, included maps showing China’s
nine-dashed line. These notes led to responses
and counter-protests from other interested South
China Sea states – notably Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Vietnam – that, in turn, led to further
diplomatic correspondence. These diplomatic – and
not so diplomatic – exchanges are revealing in that
they serve at least to partially clarify the positions
of these states. What is also clear, however, is
that China not only regards the disputed South
China Sea islands as being ‘indisputably’ subject
to Chinese sovereignty, but also that these islands
are capable of generating the full suite of claims to
maritime jurisdiction.

The South China Sea is also host to claims to
maritime space apparently based on historic
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Maritime boundary and joint
development agreements
Although the South China Sea tends to be portrayed
as host to numerous contentious territorial and
maritime disputes and as a potential arena for
conflict, several encouraging maritime agreements
have been achieved, albeit generally and at the
periphery of the South China Sea. Notable examples
include boundary agreements between BruneiDarussalam and Malaysia (inherited from the United
Kingdom and through a 2009 Exchange of Letters),
Indonesia and Singapore (1973 and 2009), Thailand
and Malaysia (1979), Thailand and Vietnam (1997),
China and Vietnam (2000), and Indonesia and
Vietnam (2003).
Additionally, the South China Sea hosts multiple
maritime joint development agreements and
cooperative arrangements of a practical nature.
These include those between Malaysia and
Thailand (agreed in principle in 1979 and
implemented from 1990) concerning seabed
energy resources; between Malaysia and Vietnam,
also related to seabed hydrocarbons exploration
and development in 1992; and between China
and Vietnam in 2000, concerning joint fishing
activities as part of their above-mentioned maritime
boundary treaty. Cambodia and Thailand also
agreed in principle to pursue an accord on maritime
joint development for part of their overlapping
claims area in 2001, although little progress has
subsequently been achieved. Further, through their
2009 Exchange of Letters Brunei and Malaysia
reportedly reached an accommodation with respect
to formerly disputed seabed areas now confirmed
as under Brunei’s jurisdiction, but according to
Malaysia’s national oil company, Petronas, a leading
role in their exploration.

Increasingly contested waters?
In one sense little has changed in relation to
the South China Sea disputes. The sovereignty
disputes over islands that are at the root of the
problem remain unresolved and there appears
little prospect of their being addressed in the
foreseeable future. Further, no new maritime
claims have been advanced as such. For example,
continental shelf rights are inherent to coastal
states so the submissions relating to the outer
limits to the continental shelf made to the CLCS
do not constitute fresh claims in a legal sense. The
counterpoint is that their articulation has proved
to be highly contentious. Thus, these submissions
and the diplomatic notes that they prompted
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have provided welcome, albeit partial clarification
regarding at least some of the previously ambiguous
claims of the South China Sea coastal states.
Simultaneously, however, the stark differences
between the opposing positions of the claimant
states have also been highlighted.
What does appear to have changed in recent years
is that there has been a significant escalation in
tensions in the South China Sea. In particular, in
recent years a series of incidents have occurred
involving Chinese maritime surveillance and
enforcement agencies and Chinese-flagged
fishing vessels in waters closer to the proximate
mainland and main island coastlines than to the
nearest disputed islands. Such actions appear
to be based on the nine-dashed line, rather than
maritime claims in line with the terms of UNCLOS
advanced from the disputed islands. Incidents have
included enforcement activities related to fisheries
jurisdiction, for example with respect to waters that
Indonesia considers to form part of its EEZ, as well
as interventions to disrupt oil and gas survey and
exploration activities conducted by Malaysia, the
Philippines and Vietnam in their respective coastal
waters. Moreover, in June 2012 the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) issued tenders for
oil concessions in close proximity to the Vietnamese
coastline, yet just within the nine-dashed line.
These incidents appear in part to have arisen as
certain South China Sea coastal states, notably
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam
have sought to undertake activities in what they
consider to be their waters, proximate to their
mainland and main island coasts. These states
appear to have taken the view that those parts of
the South China Sea closer to their undisputed
territories than to any disputed feature in the South
China Sea are undisputed. It is increasingly apparent
that China disagrees. Worryingly, China not only
appears resistant to such efforts to restrict or
minimise the area of the South China Sea subject
to dispute, but is also apparently increasingly willing
to back up its assertions with enforcement actions
on those waterways, apparently up to the limits of
the nine-dashed line which encompasses the vast
majority of the South China Sea. It also remains
open to question whether recent efforts on the part
of the Philippines to initiate arbitral proceedings with
China under Annex VII of UNCLOS on a number
of uncertainties in the Chinese position, including
the status of the nine-dashed line assertion and
the status and role of certain South China Sea
insular features, will bear fruit. Consequently, for the
foreseeable future the South China Sea states are
indeed faced with increasingly contested waters.
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